Cold War Crucible: The Personalities of the 'Grand Alliance' and the World They Made

During the Second World War, Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States established an alliance. A prevalent debate regarding this alliance pertains to the foreign policy of Franklin D Roosevelt and his conduct during the negotiations. This article will assess how much control Roosevelt maintained within the alliance and among the allied leaders. In pursuing this objective, I will present the argument that Roosevelt performed the function of the ‘adhesive’ that secured the alliance's stability and worked to mitigate discrepancies by exercising his charm and sagacity. Roosevelt’s goal for unprecendented post-war cooperation and global integration was well-intentioned. His actions at Tehran, however, would drive a wedge in an otherwise reasonable Anglo-American alliance. FDR’s overt courtship of Stalin, at the expense of Churchill, was not ideal at the ‘first impressions’ conference in Tehran.

Various historians have engaged in counterfactual reasoning about what could have happened if he had avoided death, but these neglect what he actually did achieve in his lifetime - his most notable achievement was his navigation of the hubris and psyche of each member, including his own. After his passing both Winston Churchill and Josef Stalin would proclaim their ‘love’ for him, and there’s little reason to doubt their sincerity. That both these men, despite their various rifts and grievances, would profess such an emotion for the man is telling of the influence FDR had in his dealings with them.

However, this role would involve him giving up significant ground on vital issues that would lead to predicaments in foreign policy for decades to come. With each party having different suspicions about each other, there would be many issues along the way. Bargaining for national interest, personal politics, and several strategical failures necessitated significant compromises in the face of a new reality. The argument will illustrate that FDR exerted more influence than Churchill and that this influence increased over time. FDR's explicit alliance with Stalin at the expense of Churchill demonstrated how British influence diminished over the course of the war and subsequently within the alliance. Additionally, the alliance exhibited potentially severe defects in character; accompanied by failing physical and mental health, instances of doubt, and clandestine negotiations that some allies were not informed of. The alliance fell apart rapidly within a year of his passing away – demonstrating that FDR was indispensable in sustaining it.

A Diplomatic Poker Metaphor Ruins a Perfectly Good Political History

Or How Harry Hopkins literally worked (and drank) himself to an early grave: Part One

Josef Stalin referred to Europe in 1939 as a ‘poker game’ between Great Britain, Germany, and Russia. He feared the British ‘democracy’ just as much as he feared Hitler and had sent probes to ally with either of them. Britain did respond and sought to get him onside, though Stalin was not impressed with what they had to offer, remarking “They're not being serious” and “London and Paris are playing poker again…”. When Germany showed signs of preparing for war, Britain and France made a commitment to secure Poland's borders. This would result in the USSR forming an alliance with Germany. Stalin regarded the Anglo-French positioning as additional 'confirmation' of the democracies' 'strategies' against him. Poland was swiftly subdued by Germany and the USSR, and France shortly thereafter.

Roosevelt experienced domestic pressure to maintain neutrality while being inundated with requests from Churchill for aid – including munitions and US belligerency, for a large part of 1940. Winston adopted a heavy-duty approach on occasion, to the degree of proposing the ‘peace compromises’ that might require relinquishing both the French and British Fleets to Nazi Germany if no aid was forthcoming and the war took a decidedly dark(er) turn. FDR gradually shifted toward backing Britain by means of periodic measures that elicited heated debate in Congress and in public. FDR’s cautious demeanor, shaped by his political aspirations, fueled doubt about his sincerity that exacerbated traditional disputes. To the Americans, Churchill epitomized British imperialism. To the British, FDR was the leader of the ‘recalcitrant child’ that seceded.

FDR sent his most trusted aide Harry Hopkins to London to soothe their concerns. On arrival, Hopkins was determined “to get a real understanding of Churchill and the men whom he sees after midnight”. This was fortunate because Churchill, a man of the bottle, often slept through vast amounts of the day so his operating hours would be right up Hopkins’ alley. Harry, also a determined alcoholic, would eventually become ‘the last man Churchill saw at night’. Here we encounter Churchill’s reliance on medication and alcohol. Lord Moran, his doctor, prescribed both sleeping aids (‘downers’) and stimulants (‘uppers’) to Winston. This led to what Lord Beaverbrook described as “terrifying” judgement, decisions made “at 1:30 a.m”, and that people agreed with him simply “because [they] wanted to go to bed”. On a cocktail like this, one could see where both his energetic enthusiasm and deeply depressive moods came from.

Reporting to FDR, Hopkins surmised that Churchill “controls the grand strategy” and that he was “the only person here” that FDR had to have “a full meeting of minds with”. Hopkins deftly achieved his goal of getting close to Churchill, in summing up their new friendship Harry draw a few tears from Winston by quoting a bible verse on his last night in London. Hopkins’ visit gave the ‘special relationship’ some impetus and put in place the first conference between FDR and Churchill, to be held near Newfoundland in August 1941. Hitler’s invasion of Russia in June 1941 would bring in the last member of “The Big Three” - Josef Stalin.

Churchill and Grand Strategical Control, FDR’s Diplomatic Onslaught

Or How Harry Hopkins literally worked (and drank) himself to an early grave: Part Two

Apropos the addition of Stalin, Churchill had to perform an act of tremendous political contortion, pivoting overnight from a fierce opponent of ‘the foul baboonery of Bolshevism’, he decided that ‘If Hitler invaded hell, I would at least make a favourable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons’. Lucifer himself did not quite get that honour – but in Stalin, they were dealing with a man who made reckless gambles, had fits of uncontrollable rage, was endlessly neurotic, and solved most problems with execution. Nonetheless, he was fiercely intelligent, prone to displays of genuine affection, was a quiet listener, a poet, and an avid reader of history.

FDR was determined to get a measure of Stalin. Ever the workhorse, Hopkins was dispatched to find out. In Moscow, Hopkins found an impressive man when Stalin went on the charm offensive. Ostensibly in the throes of ideological conversion, Stalin remarked that “the President and the United States had more influence with the common people of the world today than any other force.” A ‘communist’ in the streets, a ‘capitalist’ in the sheets.

Stalin secretly remained sceptical, in keeping with his nature. FDR would have to be the one to woo him. However, Roosevelt’s focus was on the conference with Churchill in Newfoundland and Labrador. FDR knew that his officers could never match the ‘grand strategy’ of Churchill and his officers, so he ruled out any agreements on a joint strategy while seeking to impose some personal diplomacy and increase aid to Russia. A time zone conflict perfectly stamped authority, the ships carrying their respective leaders were ninety minutes apart. The Prince of Wales had to put out to sea with an ‘infuriated’ Churchill on board, ‘banging about the decks, hunting a target for his wrath’.

One key point in the ‘Atlantic Charter’ they came away with regarded opposition to the subjugation of people in occupied Europe, which were elastic enough for FDR to use against imperialism worldwide. Roosevelt spoke of ‘international trusteeship’, and his State Department made attempts for a ‘firm timetable’ for the independence of British colonies. Roosevelt’s primary targets lay in the Pacific but also put in motion negotiations for Indian Independence in 1942. This led to a message wherein Churchill implied resignation and FDR backed down.

When Japan attacked Pearl Harbour in December, Churchill hurried to Washington to make his presence felt. On being asked to consider American preferences for strategy following Pearl Harbour, Churchill replied, “Oh! That is the way we talked to her when we were wooing her”, indicating the change in tone now the US was in the war alongside him. Stalin had long been promised an early push from the West to alleviate pressure on the Eastern Front. 1942-43 would be a period of Churchillian strategic control, who was not a fan of the direct approach.

We need to recall that the war's resolution was far from inevitable when the alliance was forming. The unlikely partnership originated from necessity – each leader comprehended that their three nations needed to act in a cohesive and cooperative manner in order to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion. The issue that generated the most controversy among the three of them was the 'Second Front'. Stalin had been given a commitment of an early offensive from the West to alleviate the pressure on the Eastern Front. Churchill contended to Roosevelt that an early offensive would be counterproductive and endorsed 'peripheral' tactics in the Mediterranean - similar to Churchill's strategy at Gallipoli. Which, needless to say, did not have the desired effect - though it does illustrate that Churchill had very select preferences for unorthodox strategies, and perhaps that he might have liked another shot at ‘proving the bastards wrong’ in doubling down on what would have to be regarded as his great strategical failure (though he alone does not bear all, or even most, of the blame for that fiasco).

In July 1942, the Americans suggested that if a channel crossing was not on the table, they would consider a ‘Pacific First’ strategy. Churchill’s emotional response to this proposition was to complain “Just because the Americans can’t have a massacre in France this year, they want to sulk and bathe in the Pacific”. Roosevelt might have been inclined to agree, a significant difference between the democracies and the USSR was a heightened responsibility to preserve the lives of those fighting on their behalf. The USSR had no such qualms and the debate over the location of the second front can be viewed as something of a culture clash.

With the Americans pushing invasion of France, Churchill’s mood over a US pivot to the Pacific led to a stalemate; one FDR would have to smooth over while navigating divisions among his own Chiefs of Staff. With those divisions in mind, despite FDR’s warnings, the well-prepared British planners ran rings around the US at the Casablanca Conference in 1943 and left with their strategy in the Mediterranean intact. As the chief US planner concluded; “…one might say we came, we listened, and we were conquered”. Roosevelt would have to rely on his charismatic style of diplomacy, and Churchill’s artistic talent in crocodile drawings, to assuage Stalin’s disappointment over the ensuing delay of the Second Front.

The Problem with Tehran

Roosevelt, constrained to diplomatic strategy, used the ‘carrot’ of the second front issue with the USSR for the ‘stick’ of potentially malleable agreements regarding recognition of Soviet frontier demands. Stalin and Molotov both often expressed a preference for a French landing in lieu of immediate agreements on borders. While this approach would work well for much of the delay, the frontier question would be decided at Tehran. FDR firmly believed the issues over Eastern Europe were best solved via a working relationship with the USSR. It is for this reason he rejected Churchill’s push for a ‘united front’ against Stalin at Tehran. He would, in fact, rely on the opposite approach.

At Tehran, FDR would purposely craft public ‘rifts’ between himself and Churchill as a demonstration that there was no ‘united front’ between the democracies against the USSR. Frank Costigliola notes that FDR shaped his diplomacy at Tehran to fit the Russian ‘emotional disposition’. He also noted FDR’s recognition that Russia had “grown so strong” and “…must be treated at least as an equal”. While not wishing to draw any absolute conclusions, this statement may explain FDR’s treatment of the British at Tehran.

Though both the Americans and the British had reached an agreement on ‘OVERLORD’ (the Second Front/D-Day) at Quebec in 1943, it did not receive absolute priority. Roosevelt, conscious of the Casablanca outcome, welcomed Stalin’s overwhelming push for OVERLORD. With two against one, Churchill reluctantly gave in. On the Baltics and Poland, Roosevelt ostensibly took the position that Soviet historical ties there were significant, as Stalin had pointed out. Though he felt it would create public opinion issues back at home, he postponed decisions on details. Roosevelt also mostly agreed with Stalin when it came to the division of Germany post-war, despite Churchill’s opposition, and his own goals before the conference.

At Tehran, FDR stayed at the Russian embassy, took Stalin’s side in many disputes, and ‘poked fun’ at Churchill’s ‘Britishness’ and imperialism. FDR and Stalin were both vehement critics of colonialism and Churchill bore the brunt of that dislike. FDR also dismissed Churchill’s invitation to a private lunch, but readily agreed to meet with Stalin in private. Much to Churchill’s dismay, he had lost strategic control and his vision of an Anglo-American control of the alliance rapidly slipped away. Asked about his thoughts on the conference so far, Churchill’s abrupt response was “a whole bloody lot has gone wrong”.

Any difficult decisions that required ‘fleshing out’ – such as the Baltics and Poland, FDR would put off, leaving them to be dealt with by others. Frank Costigliola notes British diplomat Alexander Cadogan’s perception of failure in Tehran. Cadogan had stated, “In his own amateurish way [FDR] had said a lot of indiscreet and awkward things”. Roosevelt himself recognised that he might have gone ‘too far’ in Tehran by conceding to too many of USSR aspirations. Churchill was even more pessimistic, fearing another “bloody war” or even the end of civilisation, as he confided to Lord Moran. FDR confessed to Churchill that he felt “dubious” about having all their “eggs in one basket”, and that it was a “ticklish” business in keeping “the Russians cozy with us”. With Stalin favouring Churchill’s ‘spheres of influence’, FDR remarked to a US Senator that he would “have to work on both of them”. With the ‘percentages agreement’ that ‘work’ would be hampered significantly.

The ‘Percentages Agreement’ and Churchill Descendant

It became clear to Churchill that British clout in the coalition and his bond with FDR had declined. He had relied on Roosevelt to offset Soviet might. Following Tehran, Churchill acknowledged that Britain was the 'poor English donkey' confronting 'the great Russian bear'. In Moscow, he entered into the infamous 'percentages agreement’ with Stalin. British influence was weakening, so Churchill had few choices in the negotiations. He had to use a mix of strategies: trying to get better deals through secret talks with each ally separately - and trying to sow discord between the two stronger allies. He clearly wanted to regain some of his power, and that of the Empire as a whole, by excluding FDR from the 'percentages' talks. The British Empire had been declining for a long time, but Churchill was slow to acknowledge that trying to revive it was a foolish endeavor.

By conceding that Britain might face the prospect of Russian hegemony in Europe on its own post-war, Churchill was deploying a 'vested interest' negotiation leadership tactic that was realistic, given his reading of the situation at the time. FDR had communicated the US intention to withdraw from Europe after they secured victory. Roosevelt was initially unconcerned by Churchill's move to unilaterally deal with matters in Eastern Europe, but he asserted US interest in events "everywhere" after some anxious advisers impressed upon him the importance of having his presence, and that of the United States in general, felt if any negotiations were to be carried out without his personal input. Indeed, Stalin was perplexed when FDR conveyed that the Moscow talks were merely a "preliminary" phase to a fully-fledged meeting of the three. Stalin had assumed Churchill was FDR's delegate. The whole affair indicates that Churchill wasn’t below excluding FDR for political gain.

While Churchill was seen as a ‘grand’ strategist, FDR’s strength would be in diplomacy – winning friends and influencing people, by any means necessary. These qualities were legendary – as historian David Reynolds notes, he was a “…past-master at telling his listeners what they wanted to hear”. His preference for ‘ideas’ over plans would lead him to rely on delegates to do the heavy lifting, as did his deteriorating health.

On many matters, Churchill often resorted to lowly begging and making concessions that were injudicious with foresight for some degree of advantage and what is apparent to us now that the mood in 1940 reveals Churchill as a statesman in a state of despair. He feverishly peppered Roosevelt with cables that became ever more desperate as time dragged on. He frequently attempted to draw out cooperation from Roosevelt by making appeals of immense pathos, invoking a sense of comradeship, and obligation to democracy. He even engaged in a bit of minor extortion when he 'threatened' to resign his Prime Ministership. On more than one occassion.

Stalin Ascendant, FDR’s Demise, and the Fallout in the ruins of Europe

Stalin relied more on his 'deception' and craftiness than anything else - but it often gave him what he wanted. Churchill made the problems they encountered in Yalta worse, especially in light of his 'percentages agreement’ with Stalin that deliberately excluded FDR, not to mention Churchill’s callous and cynical exploitation and abandonment of most of Eastern Europe, whose fate was largely placed in Stalin’s hands as a result. FDR also had his own political goals to pursue, as he was going through a crucial election during these discussions. To be successful in politics at home, he had to make sure the public respected his actions in the alliance and the allies themselves.

All of “The Big Three” enjoyed a drink, Stalin would preside over lavish and highly charged drinking sessions, encouraging all his ‘comrades’ to have vast quantities of vodka – but as he once let on to a German diplomat, he limited his drinking to ‘clear wine’ that looked like vodka. It is unlikely that he would’ve had the chance to see his fellow members of the “Big Three” lose their inhibitions around him, but it is certain that their diplomats did. Frank Costigiola relates an incident at the Kremlin where Averell Harriman and Clark Kerr, US and British ambassadors to Russia respectively, were subjected to a ‘drinking contest’ with Molotov, military intelligence chief Aleksandr Cherbakov, and a future Ukranian “foreign minister” – all of whom would hold critical post-war jobs.

It is essential to note that an alliance with the Soviets was perceived as a necessity by London and Washington. Consequently, they made concessions early in the course of events to prevent a hypothetical U-turn back to Berlin by Stalin. Within the “Grand Alliance” was a sense of mistrust among the three parties that FDR had to address and resolve. The trust among the members was insufficient, and this led to them receiving inconsistent messages from one another, engaging in conflicts motivated by ego and hubris, and giving assurances that altered the ‘balance of power’ in Europe as it entered a phase of reconstruction.

Compared to Europe, which was devastated and lost many civilians, the American economy was in a better shape, and their continent was whole. The US mainland and its people were almost unscathed by the war. As a result of the lend-lease deal with Roosevelt, Britain's debt to the US grew, and Churchill seemed to fail in his strategy, which weakened his clout in the final talks. FDR and Stalin were aware of this and exploited it, and Stalin ended up with a much better deal than he had originally aimed for. Therefore, the Soviets came out of the war with their main objectives secured, obtaining substantial concessions from FDR and Churchill who had to deal with the facts on the ground, as well as their own exhausted populations at home.

Rather than relying on the State Department and Vice-President Truman, FDR chose to entrust his aides and diplomats with the more critical missions that related to the fundamental pillars of his grand strategy. FDR devoted much of his waning energy to shaping the post-war world, a vision he almost fully achieved, and this would have momentous implications. It is worth noting that many of the institutions and concepts that FDR promoted are still present today. However, the way he delegated and trusted only a tiny group of people caused a tense and remote relationship among 'the Big Three' after he died - particularly with the USSR.

The conclusion of hostilities resulted in significant changes in the influence each member possessed at the outset of the alliance; the Soviets obtained an upper hand through their presence in Poland, most of eastern Europe and Germany - and the US overtook Britain as the predominant democratic power in the Atlantic, and eventually, global hegemony.

Engaging in too much speculation as a historian is often a futile endeavor, but it is challenging to resist the tendency to presume ‘what might have been’ if FDR had communicated his ultimate objectives more openly with people outside of the exceptionally tight circle that he relied on to accomplish his vision.

Bibliography

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Kimball, Warren F. The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991. https://quod-lib-umich-edu.ezproxy.newcastle.edu.au/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=acls;idno=heb08346.0001.001.

Mumford, Michael D, and Judy R Van Doorn. ‘The Leadership of Pragmatism Reconsidering Franklin in the Age of Charisma’. The Leadership Quarterly, 2001, 31.

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———. ‘The Diplomacy of the Grand Alliance’. In The Cambridge History Of The Second World War, edited by Richard J. B. Bosworth and Joseph A. Maiolo, 301–23. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1017/CHO9781139524377.015.

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Weinberg, Gerhard L. A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II. Cambridge University Press, 2005.